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I. INTRODUCTION
For anyone who has worked in the area of campaign finance in
the United States, Britain would at first sight appear to be nothing less
than a Paradise Island. General elections are not set quadrennial
events, preceded by months if not years of active campaigning. In-
stead, general elections are called at the discretion of the Prime Minis-
ter at some point within a five-year period,' and the formal election
1 See ROBERT BLACKBURN, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN BRrrAIN 18 (1995). It is a
royal prerogative of the Queen to dissolve Parliament, but by constitutional conven-
tion she does so only upon the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister
may request the Queen to issue a proclamation of dissolution at any time so long as
he does so within five years of the date of a Parliament's first meeting. See id. at
18-21.
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campaign period generally lasts just over a month.2 Moreover, the
United States heralds a constitutional right of free speech and the Su-
preme Court, as final arbiter in such matters, has viewed Congres-
sional attempts to regulate campaign finance as an infringement of
that fundamental right. Great Britain has no unified written constitu-
tion, much less an unequivocal right of free speech, and the traditional
view is that the power of Parliament is supreme.3 The actual size of
electoral districts are dramatically different as well. Unlike the United
States, where a U.S. Senate candidate in a state such as California
must campaign across vast distances to reach millions of voters, elec-
toral districts in Britain are relatively small, with an average of 70,000
voters per parliamentary constituency. Finally, whereas campaigns in
the United States are expensive broadcast media events dominated by
television and radio advertisements, Britain bans all paid election
broadcast advertisements. In short, given the differences in time, size
and methodology of election campaigns, the financial component
would appear to be a non-issue in British politics. However, such a
conclusion would be manifestly wrong.
Financial scandals have punctuated British politics throughout
this century, many of them directly related to political party funding.
In the early years, the conferring of honours for significant party do-
nations "was the done thing' 4 which ultimately led to the passage of
the 1925 Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act. The Act made it illegal
to give or accept money or other valuable consideration for the in-
ducement or reward for obtaining a title. Nonetheless, a "culture of
money for honours" allegedly has continued. There has never been a
conviction under the 1925 Act. One commentator noted that such
2 There are various events which flow from the dissolution proclamation, such as
the issuance and service of writs, notice of the election by publication and notice of
the time for filing and challenging of nomination papers. Given the statutory time-
frames for these events, a minimum of 17 days will elapse between the issuance of
the proclamation and election day. See GUIDANCE FOR ACTING RETURNING OFFICERS
IN ENGLAND AND WALES, HOME OFFICE, ch. 2 (1997). Since 1959, the median
length of time between announcement and vote had been 31 days. See DAVID BUT-
LER & DENNIS KAVANAUGH, THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1997, 82 (1997).
3 The impact of Britain's membership in the European Union and the incorporation
of the European Convention on Human Rights have arguably altered the supremacy
of the Westminster Parliament. See generally P. P. Craig, Sovereignty of the United
Kingdom Parliament After Factortame, in Y.B. EUR. L. 221,221-55 (A. Barav & D.
A. Wyatt eds., 1991).
4 COLIN CHALLEN, PRICE OF POWER: THE SECRET FUNDING OF THE TORY PARTY 8
(1997).
5 Id. at 12; see also BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 325-26.
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convictions are unlikely because "unless someone makes the mistake
of putting an offer in writing, it is impossible to establish any causal
connection between a cheque written by an individual to a political
party and a knighthood conferred by the Queen five years later.",6 Sta-
tistics compiled by the Labour Research Department, which studies
annual reports of companies for political donations, show a high cor-
relation between honours granted to business executives and dona-
tions from their respective companies during the Thatcher govern-
ment. This sufgests that the practice did not fade with the passage of
the 1925 Act.
Indeed, the 1990s brought its own sleaze headlines involving
party funding. For instance, Mohamed Al-Fayed, reportedly anxious
to obtain British citizenship, gave the then governing Conservative
Party £250,000. According to press accounts, when citizenship was
not forthcoming, Mr. Fayed went public with his allegations of cash-
for-questions, which ultimately led to the demise of Neil Hamilton's
parliamentary career. 8 Another episode that engendered negative press
involved Asil Nadir, a businessman who fled the country when his
business empire collapsed, amid allegations of embezzlement and
fraud. The Conservative Party had accepted some £440,000 from Asil
Nadir and then refused to return the money when told that it may have
came from stolen funds.9
These and other news stories concerning Tory funding practices
appeared regularly in the press the year before the 1997 general elec-
tion. One series focused on funding from Yugoslav businesses subject
to an embargo under UN sanctions against Yugoslavia.10 Another se-
ries focused on the Government's failure to disclose to the Scrutiny
6 See MARTIN LINTON, MONEY AND VOTES 73 (1994)
7 See generally COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FIFTH REPORT, Vol. 2,
1998 (reporting on the funding of political parties in the United Kingdom) [hereinaf-
ter CSPL]. Others argue that the alleged correlation is misleading and that those
receiving honours would have been selected regardless of their political contribu-
tions. See, e.g., CSPL. 2399 (testimony of Brian Wyldbore-Smith on May 6,
1998); id. 3140, 3157 (recording testimony of Lord Pym on May 13, 1998).
8 See generally Stephen Boggan, History of Doubtful Donations, INDEP., Jan. 20,
1998, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Indpnt File.
9 See generally James Blitz et al., Tories Urged to Return Nadir Cash, FIN. TIMES,
May 21, 1996, at 1; BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 321.
'o See, e.g., David Leppard & Tim Kelsey, Prince Charming's Chequered Career,
SUN. TIMES, May 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Times File; see also
James Blitz, TORIES PRESSED TO REVEAL FUNDING AFTER YUGOSLAV "GIFT," FIN.
TIMES, May 20, 1996, at 1.
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Committee that it had received some £4 million from a knighthood
nominee a few months before the honour was recommended." Still
others detailed allegations that the Tories were accepting large
anonymous donations from foreign sources, including £500,000 from
the son of a drug trafficker who had fled Hong Kong for Taiwan.'
2
The press also published articles describing Tory fundraising "clubs"
where donors contributing above certain amounts were conferred
membership and awarded invitations to functions with ministers and
even, for top donors, to dinner with the Prime Minister. 13 Stories also
began to emerge that questioned Labour Party funding practices. In
particular, questions were raised concerning the creation and financ-
n The money allegedly was given as a loan and then converted into a gift a month
after knighthood was granted. See Fiammetta Rocco, Graham Kirkman's Big Secret
Since He Received Knighthood in the New Year's Honours List, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 15, 1996, at 22, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, PROMT File. The
Political Honours Scrutiny Committee (PHSC) consists of three Privy Counsellors,
drawn from different parties, which advises the Prime Minister on a confidential
basis. PHSC scrutinizes nominations for political service, which amount to about
five percent of all nominees on the honours list, to ensure the probity of the honour
to be awarded. The committee takes into consideration the nominee's party contribu-
tions and obtains information on such contributions for the previous five years from
the relevant party's Chief Whip. See CSPL, supra note 7, at 258 (opening statement
by Lord Pym, Chairman of the Political Honours Scrutiny Committee on May 13,
1998). Political donations are not viewed as a disqualifying factor and indeed, may
be viewed in a positive light. "[T]he principle we follow is that if somebody gives
their money to a political party, that is a bonus point rather than a minus because
they are supporting what they believe in with their own money". See CSPL, supra
note 7, 3124 & 3153 (PHSC Chairman Lord Pym's Evidence to CSPL, May 13,
1998). According to the Labour Party's Director of Finance, the Chief Whip will
call him for information pertaining to an individual's party donations. Information
concerning possible donations to blind trusts operated on behalf of any members of
the party leadership would not be revealed to the Chief Whip by the Finance Direc-
tor. Accordingly, the Political Honours Scrutiny Committee would not be aware of a
nominee's contributions to any blind trust. See CSPL, supra note 7, 3464-68
(testimony of David Pitt-Watson on May 13, 1998).
12 See Nicholas Rufford & Maurice Chittenden, Hong Kong Cash Fills Tory Cof-
fers, SUN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997 available at <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/
news/pages/stiI97/03/16>; see also generally Michael White, Tories Silent on
"Anonymous Boost to Election War Chest," GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 1997, at 1, avail-
able in 1997 WL 2371223 (discussing large anonymous donations from British and
foreign businessmen).
13 See Colin Brown & Chris Blackhurst, Tories Hit By Fresh Sleaze Row, INDEP.,
July 22, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 10946451. The Labour Party has insti-
tuted similar fundraising clubs. See CSPL, supra note 7, 1% 974-83 (testimony of
Margaret McDonagh on Apr. 21, 1998).
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ing of "blind trusts" to fund Mr. Blair's private office as Leader of the
Opposition and other members of Labour's front bench.1 4 Even the
Liberal Democrats' fundraising practices were challenged when the
party issued invitations to businessmen to meet with local councillors
at a luncheon which cost £195 per person.15
In the year since the election, there has been continued focus on
the finances of both the Tory and Labour parties. Questions have been
raised about how the Tory Party was able to eliminate their nearly £20
million debt as of 1995 and spend £28 million on the 1997 election. 16
On the Labour Party side, articles documented the shift toward new
sources of funding, particularly large contributions from various in-
dustrialists "linked to companies which stood to make huge profits
from ministerial approval of controversial planning decisions." Once
again, news accounts drew attention to the award of peerages, noting
that several of Labour's biggest donors or fund-raisers had been se-
lected for such honours.18
The biggest story, in the post-election era, commonly known as
the "Formula One Fiasco," broke in mid-November, just six months
after Labour's victory in the 1997 election. Bernie Ecclestone, a for-
mer donor to the Conservative Party and mainstay of Formula One
racing, gave the Labour Party a £1 million donation in January, 1997.
In mid-October, Mr. Ecclestone met informally with Mr. Blair at
Downing Street and two weeks later, the Government, despite its
party platform or manifesto commitment to ban cigarette advertising
in sporting events, agreed to press the European Union to exempt
14 See Nicholas Rufford, Fundraiser Quits Over Blair's Secret Cash, SUN. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 16197365; see James Blitz, Tories Angry
Blair's Funds Will Not Be Probed, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997, at 8.
15 See Ewen Macaskill, Lib Dems Deny Sleaze Allegations, GUARDIAN, Nov. 16,
1996, at 12; George Parker, Lib Dems Face Sleaze Attach Over Lunch Invite, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 4.
16 See Tories Raised £38m in Pre-election Year, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at 4;
Fran Abrams, Tories Spent More than £20m in Run-up to the Election, INDEP., Feb.
14, 1998, at 6; see generally Steve Boggan & Andrew Buncombe, Exclusive: Secret
Donors Who Saved Tories, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 23, 1998, at 1.
17 David Leppard et al., New Peer Gave Labour L1M, SUN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File.
18 Cf. Allison Boshoff, Honours: Putnam's New Role as a Life Peer, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH, Aug. 2, 1997, at 4 (noting the award of peerage to Sir David Putnam);
Nicholas Rufford, Tories Attack Blair's "Cash for Coronets" Peerages, SUN. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1997; Charles Nevin, Dishing Out the Goodies, GUARDIAN, Jan. 26, 1998,
Feature Page, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
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Formula One racing from such a ban. The matter attracted further
public attention because the government slowly released information,
some of which was either inaccurate or misleading. 19 The Government
ultimately referred the issue of party funding to the Committee on
Standards in Public Life (CSPL or Neill Committee).2' Tony Blair
made an extraordinary television appearance to explain the affair and
to apologize for the way it had been handled.2'
The mere intensity of press coverage and the catchiness of head-
lines do not establish wrongdoing. Indeed, one of the problems asso-
ciated with the current lack of disclosure in party funding is that the
shadow of secrecy easily fosters an appearance of impropriety that
can transform innocent transactions into sinister scandals. This in-
creases public cynicism of the political process, deters benevolent
contributors from giving and makes it harder for parties to raise the
funds they need to perform their functions effectively.
This article is aimed at helping the American reader understand
political party funding in Britain. It might be helpful to convey some
preliminary information about the major political parties in Great
Britain, their role, structure, and funding sources. Once this contextual
framework has been set out, we can turn our attention to the political
party funding regime, its problems, possibilities for reform and the
actual process for reform. And, of course, we should pause to consider
what lessons we, as Americans, might learn from a system so different
from our own.
I. POLTCAL PARTES IN GREAT BRITAIN
A. Role of Political Parties
In the British governmental system, as in other parliamentary sys-
tems, the role of the political party is more prominent than in the
19 See David Leppard et al., Helping Hand?, SuN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at Fea-
tures 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File; Peter Riddell, Labour Can
Learn From This Muddle of its Own Making, TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at Features,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File; Robert Preston, What Price Poli-
tics?, FIN. TIMs, Nov. 13, 1997, at 30; see also Liam Haligan, Blair Attempts to
Clear the Political Air, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1997.
20 The author notes that the CSPL is an advisory committee to the Prime Minister
that examines standards of conduct for public officeholders and proposes recom-
mendations for changes in this area.
21 See Michael White, Blair: I Can Still Be Trusted, GUARDIAN, Nov. 17, 1997,
Home Page, at 1; Paul Routledge & Stephen Castle, Did You Lie To Us Tony?, IN-
DEP., Nov. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, INDPNT File.
1999]
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
United States. The selection of parliamentary candidates is determined
within each party in lieu of the primary election contests that are part
of American political life. Each party determines its own candidate
selection process but to the extent that process is "open," formal party
membership is a prerequisite. Party membership, which entails paying
subscription or membership fees, in essence replaces the American
practice of declaring party affiliation upon registering to vote.22 It also
means that there is an actual basis for determining the relative size of
parties, which is notably non-existent in the United States.
In Great Britain, the leader of the victorious party at a general
election becomes the Prime Minister with the right to form a govern-
ment. Members of the Prime Minister's Cabinet are drawn, by con-
vention, from elected Members of Parliament and in some instances
from the House of Lords, which would, of course, violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine within the U.S. system. In advance of the elec-
tion, each party publishes its manifesto, which becomes the "authori-
tative statement of policy intent and ideological belief., 23 The Prime
Minister, his/her Cabinet, and the party's Members of Parliament
strive to implement that manifesto, and have wide latitude to do so.
A successful party is in fact in a uniquely powerful position in govern-
ment for there are no legal constraints on what it may do. The only
constraints are practical, coming from the legacies of previous govern-
ments, the restrictions arising from international obligations, and from
the limitations imposed by the economic and political environment.24
One other constraint that might well be added to this list is that of
party cohesion. Indeed party unity is essential to the success of any
party in government. Adherence to the party line is reinforced by the
concept of collective responsibility at the Cabinet level and by a sys-
tem of strict party discipline in Parliament. Parliamentary discipline is
reinforced by the political parties' Whips, who serve as links between
the party leadership and the ordinary Members of Parliament. The
Whips are influential in advancing the career of back-benchers and
22 In Britain, the government annually establishes a registry of voters and bears the
cost of doing so. This is not the case in the United States, where parties actively
conduct campaigns to encourage voters to register. These voter drives are costly and
the means for financing them is subject to ongoing litigation. See, e.g., Fed. Elec.
Comm'n v. Cal. Dem. Party, 13 F. Supp.2d. 1031 (1998).
23 JUSTIN FISHER, BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES 4 (1996).
24 KEITH EwING, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN BRITAIN 3 (1987) [herein-
after EwING, FUNDING ].
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may bring their influence to bear in persuading Members to support
the leadership's position in debates and parliamentary votes.25
The non-governing political parties play an important role in op-
position as, in many ways, they serve as the "check" on the govern-
ment of the day. As previously noted, unlike the United States, Britain
does not have the rigid separation of powers between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government. In the absence of the
built-in institutional checks and balances present in the U.S. system,
this responsibility must be borne by the parties in opposition. In rec-
ognition of this important role, the opposition parties receive funds,
known as "Short money" to assist them in their work. 6
In the United States, the general perception of political parties
centers on their electoral function. Indeed, the national legislation
governing political party funding is called the "Federal Election Cam-
paign Act" (emphasis added). In Britain, the issue of party funding is
broader and reflects the multi-faceted role of the political parties. It is
often noted in this regard that the British have historically voted for a
particular party and its policies, and less for the particular candidate
running for office, as is done in the United States. Some have sug-
gested that British electors think of political choice along party terms
because the party is the most concrete connection they have with gov-
ernment and it is the vehicle for exerting control over government.27
In essence, the British system merges the electoral and governance
functions of political parties into a unified process, or in the words of
one commentator, "without part[ies] we would not have coherence in
government or coherence of decision-making. ' 8
25 "Whip" derives from the fox hunting term "whippers-in" which refers to those
responsible for keeping the hounds together during the hunt. HAWTREY & BARCLAY,
PARLIAMENTARY DICTIONARY 233-34 (1970).
26 See EWING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 118-21. In addition to Short money
which is granted to all opposition parties, the primary opposition party is given spe-
cial recognition by legislation and is known as "Her Majesty's Opposition." The
Leader of the Opposition receives special compensation and appoints a "Shadow
Cabinet." See BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 11-12.
27 See generally G. ALDERMAN, BRITISH ELECTIONS: MYTH AND REALITY 70-71
(1978) (describing the importance of political parties in British elections).
2 CSPL, supra note 7, 7 (testimony of Peter Riddell on Apr. 15, 1998).
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B. Current Major Parties in Great Britain29
i. The Conservative Party
Measured by the years in government during this century, the
Conservative Party has been the dominant party. In the post-war pe-
riod alone, it was in power for two long stretches of time, from 1951
to 1964, and from 1979 to 1997, some thirty-one years. The Conserva-
tives were also in power from 1970 to 1974.
-Historically, the party dates back to the eighteenth century. Until
changes enacted earlier this year, the Conservative Party's structure
set it apart from the other major parties. It consisted of three distinct
and autonomous groups: the parliamentary group consisting of Con-
servative Party MPs at Westminster (dating back several hundred
years); a national organization, the National Union of Conservative
and Unionist Associations, begun in 1867, encompassing all local
conservative constituency associations, which operate quite independ-
ently of each other, and the Conservative Central Office, or national
party headquarters, which was founded by Benjamin Disraeli.30 Col-
lectively, these groups were known as the Conservative Party.
In a 1982 court case, the Conservative Party successfully argued
that it could not be assessed corporate tax as it was neither a corpora-
tion nor an unincorporated association within the meaning of the tax
code but rather "an amorphous combination of various elements,"
linked together by the party leader. The Court of Appeal agreed, con-
cluding that the party consisted of the three separate components iden-
tified above which were not bound together by mutual undertakings
(with mutual duties and obligations).31
Until recently, individuals could only join the Conservative Party
by becoming members of their local constituency associations. Mem-
bership fees were collected by the local constituency associations, and
a portion would then be forwarded to the Central Office on a quota
basis. There is an annual Conservative Party Conference but it has not
been a forum for policy decision making and any resolutions emanat-
ing from the conference have been nonbinding on the party leader-
ship.
29 The author notes that this section relies heavily upon the work of FISHER, supra
note 23; BLACKBURN, supra note 1.
30 See FISHER, supra note 23, at 7, 35-38.
31 Central Office v. Burrell, [1982] 2 All E.R. 1, 1.
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However, since the selection of William Hague as party leader in
1997, many changes have been initiated within the Conservative
Party. For the first time, for example, the party will have an actual
legal existence. It is assembling a national membership list, and has
taken steps to increase member participation in policy formulation. 32
As Lord Parkinson, Chairman of the Conservative party told the Neill
Committee:
We have just been through a process of reform. We now exist, we have
a constitution, we have a governing board which will be responsible for
all aspects of the Party's organisation, and the associations will affiliate
to the new body but they will also supply to the new body their mem-
bership lists, so we will for the first time in our history have a central
list of members ....
Although the Conservative Party tightly controls information
concerning its sources of funding, studies conducted by Dr. Pinto-
Duschinsky and information presented during various public inquiries
suggest there has been a continual decrease in funding from institu-
tional and corporate donors, an increase in the percentage of overall
income from individual donors, and marginal changes in the amount
of funding derived from constituency quotas. 34 Although the Conser-
vative Party still receives more corporate donations35 than any other
party, the number of companies making political donations, especially
large donations, has plummeted.36
The Conservative Party acknowledges that its membership has
declined in recent years and estimates there are between 300,000 and
32 See generally THE FRESH FUTURE: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY RENEWED, (visited
Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.conservative-party.org.uk/partyorg/tff/index.html>.
33 CSPL, supra note 7, 1367 (testimony of Lord Parkinson on Apr. 22, 1988).
34 See MICHAEL PINTo-DuCHINsKY, BRITISH POLITICAL FINANCE 1830-1980, 228-
34 (1981); Michael Pinto-Duchinsky, Funding the General Election of 1987, in Po-
LITICAL COMMUNICATIONS: THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1987 15-28 (Ivor Crewe &
Martin Harrop eds., 1989); FISHER, supra note 23, at 48-51; R. J. Johnston & C. J.
Pattie, Great Britain: Twentieth Century Parties Operating Under Nineteenth Cen-
tury Regulations, in CAMPAIGN AND PARTY FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST-
ERN EUROPE 123, 133-36 (Arthur B. Gunlicks ed., 1993).
35 For information on the decline of company donations, see generally PIRC LTD.,
TRENDS IN POLITICAL DONATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER AUTHORISATION (1998). The
research undertaken by Pensions & Investment Research Consultants Limited re-
veals a tremendous drop in the number of companies making political donations in
the past six years, down by half among FTSE 350 companies. See id. at 3. The num-
ber contributing over £50,000 also has dropped from 17 to 4. See id.
36 See id.
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350,000 paid members among its constituency associations.3 7 It fur-
ther estimates the income of its constituency associations to be about
£18m per year and its Central Office income to be in the neighbor-
hood of £42.5 million for 1997. According to the Chairman, the Cen-
tral Office spent £28.3 million in the thirteen months leading up to the
1997 election, with half of it dedicated to advertising. 38
ii. The Labour Party
The history and structure of the Labour Party contrast sharply
with that of the Conservative Party. It took its current name in 1906,
having been formed by trade unions and socialist societies a few years
earlier. Unlike the Conservative Party, it had no members already sit-
ting in Parliament at its creation, has operated under a written consti-
tution from the outset and has maintained a mixed membership of in-
dividuals and institutions since 1918. For example, trade unions are
members at the constituency, regional, and national levels. The indi-
vidual trade unionists are formally members of the affiliated organiza-
tion, but have participatory rights "as individuals in internal party af-
fairs ... such as the right to vote for the leader and deputy leader of
the party... and on the election manifesto of the party."39
The Labour Party consists of constituency labour party associa-
tions and affiliated organizations that each elect delegates to the La-
bour Party Conference. The Conference is the sovereign decision-
maker on the party programme and the National Executive Committee
(NEC), a standing committee, decides which part of the programme
goes into the party manifesto. The NEC is also the administrative au-
thority of the party, tasked with running party business between con-
ferences. Seats on the NEC are distributed among the various interest
groups or "stakeholders" within the Labour Party including affiliated
trade unions, socialist societies, and constituency party associations.
Members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords are or-
ganized into the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). The PLP, individ-
37 See CSPL, supra note 7, 1365 (testimony of Lord Parkinson on Apr. 22, 1998).
In 1994, Conservative Party membership was estimated to be 750,000, and Labour
Party membership was estimated at 260,000. Justin Fisher, Political Donations to
the Conservative Party, 47 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 61, 61 (1994).
38 See Tories Raised £38m in Pre-Election Year, supra note 16; Abrams, supra note
16, at 6.
3' BACKGROUND BRIEFING, THE LABOUR PARTY: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURES &
FINANCES (THE LABOUR PARTY, U.K.) (Feb. 1998) at 3 [hereinafter BACKGROUND
BRIEFING].
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ual members, and members of affiliated organizations form an elec-
toral college that elects the leader and deputy leader of the party.n0
Trade unions have been an important source of funding for the
Labour Party since its inception. Their support has come in many
forms: from affiliation fees and donations, specific grants, sponsor-
ship of Members of Parliament, and through various forms of support
in-kind including secondment of staff, use of equipment and adver-
tisements in trade union publications.41 However, this traditional
source of support has been on the decline. According to the Labour
Party's own statistics, in the mid-1980s, approximately eighty percent
of its income came from trade unions but has now dropped to about
thirty-five to forty percent; individual and company donations during
that period have risen from twenty-eight to fifty-five percent of cen-
tral party income. The number of individual/company donations over
£5,000 rose from 24 in 1995 to about 135 in 1997.42 It is estimated
that the Labour Party spent £26.8m in the two years leading up to the
election.43
In the landslide victory in May 1997, Labour won 418 of the 659
seats in the House of Commons, assuming power with its best elec-
toral victory ever. The Labour Party has been in power on three prior
occasions since the end of World War II: from 1945 to 1951, from
1964 to 1970 and, more recently, from 1974 to 1979.
iii. The Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats evolved from the formal merger in 1988
of the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties, 44 which had formed
40 Id. at 4. In addition to the national level organization, the Labour Party has re-
gional branches and local constituency organizations throughout Britain. The re-
gional parties have structures similar to that described for the national party and at
the local level, there may be branches and women and youth sections. See CSPL vol.
1, infra note 132, at app. V, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 (discussing the Labour Party's sub-
mission to the CSPL).
41 See FISHER, supra note 23, at 78.
42 BACKGROUND BRIEFING, supra note 39, at 6. The Labour Party claims to have
400,000 individual members, the highest number for many years. Id. at 2.
43 See Michael White, "Black Holes" as Tories' Accounts Are Published, GUARD-
IAN, Feb. 14, 1998, at 5 (as discussed infra, all party funding figures must be viewed
with much skepticism given the lack of consistency as to what is included in them
and their unverifiability).
44 The Social Democrat Party originated as a breakaway group formed by four for-
mer Labour Party ministers and a former Conservative MP. See Bamber Gascoigne,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BRrrAiN 576 (1994).
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election alliances in 1983 and 1987. The party operates on a federal
basis with a national party organization. It operates state organizations
in England, Scotland, and Wales as well as local groups. Members
join at the state level with levies paid by the state groups to the na-
tional group. Administrative matters at the federal level are handled
by the Federal Executive Committee, policy proposals are drafted by
the Federal Policy Committee, and are debated and considered at the
Federal Conference. Party members cast votes for party leader, short-
listed parliamentary candidates and for Conference representatives.
Responsibility for drafting the party's manifesto falls upon the Fed-
eral Policy Committee, in consultation with the Parliamentary Party.
45
In the 1997 elections, with the assistance of tactical voting, 46 46
Liberal Democrats were elected to Parliament. The party has been a
significant factor in local government, as the second party behind La-
bour. The party receives virtually no institutional financial support
and depends heavily on membership fees and individual donations.
The party had an income of about £3.9 million in 1997.
iv. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC)
These parties share common characteristics, starting with the
shared view that English interests subordinate the concerns of Scot-
land and Wales in Westminster. Broadly speaking, both parties seek to
decentralize the power of Westminster, with the SNP aspiring toward
an independent Scotland within the European Union. The Welsh Na-
tionalist Party, Plaid Cymru, favours "self-government rather than
outright independence."4 7 Both parties have similar organizational
structures, each having an annual conference at which policy deci-
sions are made; an assembly or council for interim decision making
and a relatively powerful executive.
Both parties have regional groups with branches at the local level.
SNP selects candidates from a nationally compiled list, with constitu-
encies "short-listing" the candidates and members casting votes for
those short-listed. PC follows a different selection practice. Branches
nominate candidates, who are then presented to a selection committee
" See BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 9-10; FISHER, supra note 23, at 97.
46 In various constituencies, the desire to defeat the Tory incumbent motivated vot-
ers not to split the opposition vote. Labour and Liberal Democrat voters thus opted
to vote for the stronger opposition candidate regardless of his or her party affiliation.
See BUTLER & KAVANAUGH, supra note 2, at 251-52, 309-12. Based on Author's
conversations with Prof. Anthony King, Professor of Gov't. Univ. of Essex and
member of CSPL, and Lord Goodhart, Q.C., member of CSPL.
47 FISHER, supra note 23, at 128.
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composed of representatives from the various branches, constituen-
cies, and regional councils. Historically, PC has been more gradualist
in their approach than the SNP and in its early years focused more on
cultural issues (such as the retention of the Welsh language) than on
economic issues.
In its 1997 election manifesto, the Labour Party proposed to hold
referendums in Scotland and Wales concerning the establishment of
legislative entities for those countries.48 The establishment of a Scot-
tish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly and the devolution of certain
powers to them is envisioned as a means to "make government more
accessible, open and accountable., 49 In September 1997, the electorate
voted affirmatively on both referendums, by a large margin in Scot-
land and by a relatively small percentage in Wales.5 0 Accordingly,
legislative elections will be held in both Scotland and Wales in mid-
1999, in close proximity to local and European Parliamentary elec-
tions. Unlike elections to the Westminster Parliament, the 129-
member Scottish Parliament will be elected using an additional mem-
ber system for a four year term. Seventy-three of the members will be
elected on a constituency, first past the post basis, while the remaining
fifty-six members will be elected by party lists using proportional rep-
resentation methodology (additional member system). The sixty
member Welsh Assembly will also use an additional member system:
forty seats will be filled using the traditional, constituency based, first
48 Matters pertaining to Scotland and Wales have been handled by the central gov-
ernment which has a Scottish and a Welsh Office, each headed by a Secretary of
State. See A VOICE FOR WALES: THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR A WELSH As-
SEMBLY 7 (White Paper) [hereinafter A VOICE FOR WALES].
49 SCOTLAND'S PARLIAMENT (White Paper 1997) (prefacing the White Paper with a
letter from Prime Minister Tony Blair). The government "believes that those con-
trolling the spending and setting of standards for public service should be answer-
able to the people they serve; and that a more responsive elected body will be better
place to promote economic prosperity and quality of life across Wales." A VOICE
FOR WALES, supra note 48, at 7.
50 Similar referendum issues failed to gain the requisite level of support when pre-
sented to the electorate in Scotland and Wales by an unpopular Labour government
near the end of its term in 1979. Some attribute the difference in result to the popu-
larity of the current government, while others suggest that the unity of those
supporting devolution in the most recent referendum campaign was critical. The fact
that the Conservative Party had lost all of its parliamentary seats in Scotland just
months before the referendum and, thus, was not in a particularly strong position to
mount a "no" campaign may have also affected the result in the Scottish referendum.
See James Mitchell et al., The Scottish Devolution Referendum, 51 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAmS 166- 81 (1998).
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past the post system. The other twenty will be elected using the addi-
tional member system of party lists and proportional representation.
v. Other Political Parties
Along with the main political parties described above, there are a
number of small and fringe parties in Britain. The ecologically ori-
ented Green Party, for example, enjoyed a brief period of success
when it obtained approximately fourteen percent of the vote at the
1989 elections to the European Parliament. Other small parties in-
clude the Socialist Labour Party and the Democratic Left, the renamed
Communist Party. There are also extremist parties such as the British
National Party on the far right and fringe groups that present candi-
dates, such as the Official Monster Raving Loony Party and the Loony
Green Giant Party. 1
III. REGULATORY REGIME FOR CAMPAIGN FUNDING
A. Historic Background
Toward the end of the 19th century, there was increasing alarm
over the high costs of elections in Britain. The fact that voting was
conducted in the open and many electors viewed their "vote a salable
commodit" may well have accounted for some of the extensive
spending. 2 Parliament unsuccessfully tried to eradicate the purchase
of votes on various occasions since 1695 through the passage of sev-
eral acts including the Bribery Act 1729, the Reform Acts of 1832 and
1854, and the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854.53 Notably ab-
sent from such legislation, which in part extended the right of suffrage
to more people, were limits on the amount candidates could spend on
their campaigns. Campaigns were largely self-financed affairs, limited
to wealthy candidates who could afford to finance a campaign that
had to include incentives for an expanding electorate.54
A new weapon against bribery developed as a result of the Ballot
Act 1872. That Act introduced the secret ballot, which theoretically
made the purchase of votes unenforceable. Nonetheless, the costs and
51 See generally F.N. BALDWIN, MASTERING BRITISH POLITICS, 51-57 (1985). The
author notes that over 900 candidates ran as independents or as minor party candi-
dates in the 1992 general election.
52 H. F. RAWLINGS, LAW AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 135 (1988).
51 Id. at 135-36.
54 See Johnston & Pattie, supra note 34, at 125.
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the corruption in the 1880 general election remained high and engen-
dered concern. In response, Parliament passed the Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Act 1883, which established the basic framework for today's
election funding regulation. The 1883 Act imposed ceilings on candi-
date expenditures, limited the ty e of permissible expenditures, and
imposed liability on candidates.R These provisions, which have un-
dergone various revisions are now embodied in the Representation of
the People Act 1983 (RPA).
B. Current Regulatory Scheme
In contrast to the U.S. Federal Election Campaign Act of 197 1,56
as amended, which governs party and election funding in the United
States, the Representation of the People Act 1983 does not mention
much less proscribe the source of, or limits on the amount of, contri-
butions to political parties. There is, for example, no prohibition on
corporate or foreign contributions to either candidates or political par-
ties. Indeed, political party funding and spending is not touched upon
by the Act at all. The Act instead focuses exclusively on expenditures
and then, exclusively in the context of constituency spending.
i. Expenditure Regulations
Section 76(1) of the Act limits the amount candidates may spend
on their election. The precise amount depends on two factors, whether
the constituency is urban or rural and the number of electors in the
constituency. In general elections, there is a flat base amount per con-
stituency, £4,965 in 1997, plus an additional 4.2 pence per elector
(urban constituency) or 5.6 pence per elector (rural constituency).57
The higher rate reflects the additional costs associated with campaign-
ing in a larger, less densely populated area. Thus, as a general rule,
the spending limit in most constituencies for the 1997 general election
would not have surpassed £9,000, as the average constituency consists
of 60,000 to 70,000 electors. Expenditure limits for by-elections, or
what might be called "special" elections in the United States, are
computed differently. The current base amount is £19,863, with an
additional 22.2 pence for each registered elector in a rural constitu-
55 Id; see also RAWLINGS, supra note 52, at 136-37.
56 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1971) (codified at 2 USC §§ 431-434, 437, 437c, 437d, 437f-437h, 438, 439, 439a,
439c, 441a-441h, 451-455).
57 See Justin Fisher, The Situation in Britain 5 (presented at the Funding of Political
Parties: Europe and Beyond, Bologna, 1998) (on file with the author).
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ency and an additional 16.9 pence per elector in an urban constitu-
ency.58 The expenditure limits are not automatically indexed for infla-
tion, but may be raised at the initiation of the Home Secretary and laid
before Parliament.
To ensure accountability, the Act mandates that candidates ap-
point election agents, and all contracts which will result in election
expenditure must be made by the candidate or the election agent.
59
Moreover, only the election agent may provide payment for any elec-
tion expense.6 Essentially, all expenditures must be authorized by the
candidate or agent and all payments made by the agent so as to "pre-
vent the restrictions . . . being avoided by various persons making
payments and pleading ignorance of what payments have been made
by others." 61 The election agent is also responsible for maintaining an
account of the campaign's finances and must file an election return
and supporting documentation evidencing all income received and
expenses incurred within weeks after the end of the campaign.
62
The statute contains a second key expenditure provision, Section
75, which governs spending not authorized by the candidate's election
agent. This provision was added to the statute after a flurry of activity
by a variety of pressure groups, including Suffragettes who cam-
paigned against certain Members of Parliament opposed to extending
the right to vote to women. 63 In broad terms, the provision purports to
prohibit third parties or pressure groups from spending more than £5
"with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate at
an election."'64 The purpose of such a limitation is two-fold. First, it
" See Representation of the People Act, ch. 2, § 76(2)(aa) (1983) (Eng.) [hereinaf-
ter RPA].
'9 Any person wishing to stand for election to Westminster must post a £500 de-
posit, which is forfeited if the candidate fails to obtain more than one-twentieth of
the total number of votes cast. See GUIDANCE FOR ACTING RETURNING OFFICERS IN
ENGLAND AND WALES, HOME OFFICE, supra note 2, §§ 5.37, 10.07. This require-
ment serves to winnow out the most frivolous of candidates.
60 See RPA §§ 72, 73(1).
6! PARKER'S CONDUCT OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 304 15.04 (R. J. Clayton
ed. 1994) [hereinafter PARKER'S].
62 See RPA § 81.
63 See LINTON, supra note 6, at 7; see also EwING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 80-
81.
64 The provision provides, in pertinent part:
No expenses shall, with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a
candidate at an election, be incurred by any person other than the candidate,
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reinforces the candidate expenditure limits by foreclosing the loop-
hole of having others undertake spending on the candidate's behalf.
Secondly, it reflects the view that election campaigns are times when
candidates and political parties are center-stage and entitled to domi-
nate the debate while members of the general public quietly remain on
the side-lines.
65
In February 1998, the European Court of Human Rights issued its
decision in Bowman v. The United Kingdom, holding that the £5 limit
violated the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. 66 Ms. Bowman, Director of
the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, was prosecuted for
having spent £10,000 on 1.5 million copies of a leaflet, of which
25,000 were distributed in one constituency during a tight election
race. The leaflet characterized the incumbent candidate as a "leading
pro-abortionist" and noted that the Conservative candidate was a
staunch "defender of the unborn child." When the case was dismissed
his election agent and persons authorised in writing by the election agent on
account -
(a) of holding public meetings or organising any public display; or
(b) of issuing advertisements, circulars or publications; or
(c) of otherwise presenting to the electors the candidate or his
views or the extent or nature of his backing or disparaging an-
other candidate.
RPA § 75.
6 At the Charter 88 Conference in January 1988, the author notes that Martin Lin-
ton, MP, commented that election contests could be viewed from different perspec-
tives ranging from free-for-all combat to well-controlled jousting matches. In his
view, the jousting match, with well-defined rules of engagement was the appropriate
form for Britain and opined that limitations on third party spending prevented the
match from degenerating into a free-for-all.
6 Bowman v. United Kingdom, App. No 24839/94, 26 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1 (1998).
Article 10 of the Convention provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibili-
ties, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security.., for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1986, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
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for having been brought beyond the one year statute of limitations,
Ms. Bowman appealed, arguing that the prosecution violated her right
of free expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
The Court ruled in Ms. Bowman's favour by a vote of fourteen to
six, with two judgments being rendered for the majority. The principaljudgment concluded that Section 75 contributed to promoting equality
between candidates and thus served the legitimate purpose of protect-
ing the rights of others, in particular, the candidates and the electorate
in the constituency. The Court further noted that "free elections and
freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, to-
gether form the bedrock of any democratic system." 67 In balancing
these two rights, the court acknowledged the discretion of the Member
State and the fact that during the election period, certain restrictions
on free expression might be needed to ensure the free expression of
the people in choosing their legislature. However, the court ultimately
concluded that the £5 limit imposed by Section 75 was not a reason-
able restriction, especially in light of the fact that the press was unre-
stricted and political parties were not limited in what they could spend
on their national campaigns. 68
The modest amount of permissible election expenditure, both by
candidates and presumably by third parties in the post-Bowman era,
makes it critical to determine what counts against those expenditure
limits. Section 118 of the 1983 Act broadly defines "election ex-
penses" as "expenses incurred, whether before, during or after the
election on account of or in respect of the conduct and management of
the election." Moreover, as previously noted, Section 75 limits the
amount outsiders may spend "with a view to promoting or procuring
the election of a candidate." Although these statutory definitions are
strikingly broad, there are exclusions, which can be broken down into
three categories: costs that are statutorily excluded from the expendi-
ture limitations, expenditures that judicial decisions have deemed to
67 Bowman v. United Kingdom, 42; Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to
the Convention provides that Member States will hold "free elections at reasonable
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." Protocol to the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952,
art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 264.
(s This decision sharply contrasts with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, which
effectively forecloses limits on spending, especially independent spending of third
parties. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Conservative Pol. Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. 604, 613 (1996).
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be outside the limitations' scope, and costs that are excluded as a mat-
ter of general practice.
a. Statutory Exemptions
The statutorily exempt category includes two significant items.
First, the Act specifically exempts personal expenses incurred by
candidates during the course of the election campaign. 69 Such ex-
penses would include reasonable traveling, lodging, and subsis-
tence costs associated with the candidate's campaign, but do not
extend to costs incurred by those accompanying the candidate such
as family members or staff.70 Second, the statute, at §75(1)(c)(i),
exempts election campaign coverage for newspapers, periodicals,
and radio and television broadcasts. This latter exemption largely
mirrors its American statutory counterpart embodied at 2 U.S.C.
§431(9)(B)(i), both in intended effect and judicial construction.71
These provisions were designed to enable the media to cover cam-
paigns as part of their news services. As construed by the courts,
these provisions would not exempt advertisements or special elec-
tion editions that promote particular candidates, as such activities
would fall outside the traditional news function for which coverage
was intended.72
b. Exclusions Based on Judicial Construction
As noted, the very wording of the statute expressly includes as an
"election expense" all expenses incurred "before, during and after
6' SeeRPA§§74, 118.
70 The statute does not exclude such costs for those traveling with the candidate.
According to research conducted by Michael Crick, an investigative reporter for
BBC News night, minimizing or excluding the costs of the candidate's family and
entourage is one avenue for circumventing the constituency expenditure limit. See
CSPL, supra note 7, 1936 (testimony of Michael Crick on Apr. 30, 1998).
71 The British regulation of election coverage differs from that in the U.S. by pro-
hibiting broadcasts about a constituency during the election if a candidate in that
election "takes part in the item and the broadcast is not made with his consent...."
See RPA § 93(1). This provision, intended as a protection for minor candidates, al-
legedly has been used by strong incumbent candidates to curtail coverage of their
lesser known opponents. See BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 258, 260-61.
72 See EwING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 85-87 (discussing the history and con-
struction of the British press exemption). For the American view, see, e.g., Reader's
Digest v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Fed. Elec.
Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S.
238 (1986).
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candidacy" on account of or in respect to the conduct or management
of the election. However, early court decisions held that costs associ-
ated with the selection of candidates would not count toward the ulti-
mate selectee's limit.73 Candidates have also been allowed to attend
and participate in meetings organized by their local constituency party
in anticipation of a future election without having to attribute associ-
ated costs to the election campaign limit. This "protect[s] the freedom
of constituency parties to pursue their normal political and social ac-
tivities, even though the candidate will benefit indirectly as a result of
this activity.,
74
In short, determining what expenditures count against the limit is
a factually specific question and clear guidelines are difficult to ar-
ticulate. In a relatively recent but unreported case, Mr. Justice Kelly
set forth a two-prong test. In his view, if the expenditure was "closely
related to 'the machinery of the election"' and "primarily or princi-
pally for the promotion of the interests of the candidate," it would
count against the candidate's expenditure limit.75 However, even after
selection, candidates are fairly free to campaign without incurring ex-
penditures that will count against their campaign limit, provided they
describe themselves as "prospective parliamentary candidates" and do
not explicitly ask people to vote for them.
With regard to third party spending, judicial interpretation of sec-
tion 75 has significantly altered the application of that provision. One
of the early issues to arise under Section 75 was whether negative
campaigning fell within its scope. Was it sufficient for prosecution if
the defendant opposed the election of a candidate or did the defendant
actually have to promote the election of one of the other candidates?
Two decisions, following different rationales, confirmed that negative
campaigning would suffice, although one of them so held on the
grounds that such campaigning reflects the intention to advance the
candidacy of one of the remaining candidates.
76
73 See Birbeck v. Bullard (1886) 3 O'M and H 84, discussed in EWING, FUNDING,
supra note 24, at 75-76.
74 See EWING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 76.
75 See PARKER'S, supra note 61, 15.41. The Chairman of the Association of Elec-
toral Administrators opined that "there is no clear definition of when an election
starts, so it is a matter of interpretation for the agent" and then acknowledged that he
had "never seen a case where someone has put in an invoice or receipt for some-
thing, say, six months before an election." CSPL, supra note 7, %% 2172, 2176 (tes-
timony of John Turner on Apr. 30, 1998).
76 Compare The King v. Hailwood & Ackroyd, Ltd, [1928] 2 K.B. 277 (Eng. Crim.
App.) with Dir. Pub. Prosecutions v. Luft [1977] App. Cas. 962 (H.L.) (Lord Dip-
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The second significant line of judicial interpretation involving
Section 75 concerns its application to materials that are clearly elec-
tion related, but not specific to a particular constituency campaign. In
the leading case of R. v. Tronoh Mines Ltd,7 7 the defendant company
placed an advertisement in a national newspaper criticizing the gov-
ernment's economic program and encouraging readers to vote for a
party other than Labour.48 The Court held that the Act did not "pro-
hibit expenditure incurred on advertisements designed to support, or
having the effect of supporting, the interest of a particular party gen-
erally in all constituencies ... and not supporting a particular candi-
date in a particular constituency., 79 In so holding, the Court created an
opening for unregulated national election spending. The parties even-
tually began to adopt a "national election" advertisement strategy. The
Liberal Party took the first step in this direction in 1974 with the pur-
chase of national newspaper advertisements. In all subsequent elec-
tions, parties have dedicated increasingly significant resources to na-
tional newspaper advertisements and billboard poster campaigns. Ac-
cording to the Director-General of the Advertising Association, the
statistics that exist show the following trend in advertising expendi-
tures by political parties in recent elections.






However, these statistics lack reliability due to inconsistent ap-
proaches as to which costs the parties include in their figures. Ac-
lock); see also EwING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 95-97 (discussing legislative and
judicial action involving section 75).
77 R. v. Tronah Mines, Ltd. [1952] 1 All E.R. 697. For a fuller analysis of this im-
portant case, see EWING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 95-97.
78 The advertisement's closing words were:
The coming general election will give us all the opportunity of saving the
country from being reduced, through the policies of the Socialist government,
to a bankrupt "Welfare State." We need a new and strong government with
Ministers who may be relied upon to encourage business enterprise and initia-
tive, under the leadership of one who has, through the whole of his life, de-
voted himself to national and not sectional interests.
R. v. Tronoh Mines Ltd. 1 All E.R. at 698.
79 Id. at 699.
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counting for under-reporting, the Director-General estimates the
amount spent on advertising on the 1997 elections to be between £30
and £40 million. 80 In short, the Tronoh Mines decision fundamentally
altered British campaign methodology. It formed the basis for the
birth and rise of the national electoral campaign, which now domi-
nates electoral campaigns in Britain.
c. Exclusions Based on General Practice
Various media accounts suggest that certain practices have
evolved to avoid counting various costs against candidate expenditure
limits. The practices range from creative accounting techniques to
fraudulent concealment. Conversations with former candidates or
election agents of all major parties, many of whom would only speak
on condition of anonymity, confirm the existence of such practices,
especially in by-election and marginal general election seats. These
practices fall into two classes.
In the first instance, there is the practice of simply not reporting
certain costs. Candidates and constituency associations, for example,
may stock up on staple items such as poster board, envelopes, and
other office supplies well in advance of the election campaign period
but in anticipation of it. Although clearly intended for use in the elec-
tion, these early purchases often go unreported.
Costs associated with travel expenses attributable to the candi-
date's family, staff, and party leaders during visits to the constituency
are also likely to go unreported, and if reported at all, then at a value
less than actual cost. Others have remarked how today's campaigns
nearly always involve telephone canvassing and mobile phones, but
such costs rarely appear in expenditure reports. Similarly, support
from the national parties in the form of staff or equipment are not re-
flected in candidate reports. The amount involved in unreported staff
salaries, unreported direct mail/telephone canvassing, and unreported
'0 See CSPL, supra note 7, 2691-95 (testimony of Andrew Brown on May 7,
1998). He emphasized the unreliability of the statistics, noting that the Labour Party
did not include any costs for poster advertising in 1997, a main-stay in British elec-
toral politics, on the grounds that the Conservative Party had failed to provide such
information in an earlier campaign. See id.
In an article written shortly before the election, Pinto-Duschinsky noted that in "re-
cent elections, national publicity has accounted for up to two-thirds of central Tory
expenditure and up to half of Labour's campaign costs" Michael Pinto-Duschinsky,
Big Spenders May Be Holding Back For a Final Flourish, TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at
15.
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computer equipment can quickly add up to substantial sums, espe-
cially in the context of by-elections. 81
In the second instance, items are reported but at less than their ac-
tual cost. In addition to travel costs referred to above, campaigns may
fudge the amount spent on postage by avoiding franking machines in
favour of stamps, as the actual number used will not be verifiable and
receipts are not required.82 One former agent noted that printers who
are sympathetic to the candidate may be willing to doctor invoices in
order to keep the reportable costs to a minimum.
3
The same technique of undervaluing the amount or costs applies
to telephone line installations, telephone canvassing, staffing, and di-
rect mail. Again, it is difficult to assess the actual amount that does
not get reported, but many of the items are associated with the biggest
items of expenditure in today's election campaigns. Moreover, even if
the amount of spending that does not get properly reported were
minimal, the very fact there is an understanding that some creative
accounting will help massage the numbers at least in marginal, tough
races, suggests a tolerance to law breaking by those who seek to hold
public office and public trust, and invites a more effective enforce-
ment mechanism.
ii. Regulation of Broadcast Advertisements
An estimated $50 million was spent on advertising by each of the
1996 presidential candidates in the United States, much of it on radio
and television advertisements. 84 Britain has a long history of banning
paid political advertisements in the broadcast media, which many cite
81 Michael Crick examined the issue of by-election overspending in the context of
the Wirral South by-election held in March 1997. Based on his investigation and
research, Mr. Crick estimates that the Conservative and Labour Parties each spent
more than £100,000 on their campaigns, far in excess of the limit. In marginal gen-
eral election constituencies, his anecdotal evidence, disputed by some, suggests that
candidates may exceed the expenditure limits by two or three times the allowable
amount, spending between £20,000 and £30,000. See CSPL, supra note 7, 1% 1968,
1976 (oral testimony of Michael Crick on Apr. 30, 1998).
82 "The trouble with franking machines is that they provide evidence of how much
you have spent on postage. Much better to send volunteers down to the post office to
buy the stamps and, as I understand it, post offices in by-election towns do a roaring
trade." Id. 11916.
83 See Dominic Kennedy and Valerie Elliott, How Parties Cook the Books on Poll
Expenses, TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at 15.
84 CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE REFORM OF PARTY POLITICAL BROADCASTING,
BBC & ITC, Jan. 20, 1998, at App. 2 [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER].
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as the primary reason for the relatively low cost of campaigns. In-
stead, the parties are allocated free political party broadcasts (PPBs)
and free party election broadcasts (PEBs) during election campaigns.
This practice dates back to the creation of the British Broadcast-
ing Corporation (BBC) in the early 1920s. The BBC, by Royal Char-
ter, was tasked with controlling radio broadcasts and later television
broadcasts with political impartiality. Beginning with the 1924 gen-
eral election, the BBC offered and the parties agreed to broadcast
election messages on the radio. The practice evolved that the BBC
would propose a schedule of broadcasts, parties would be afforded an
opportunity to comment and agreements would be reached regarding
the allocation of time and scheduling. This process eventually became
"institutionalized" in 1947 with the establishment of the Committee
on Political Party Broadcasting (CPPB), consisting of representatives85
of the parties and the broadcasters. As one commentator remarked
about the Committee on Political Party Broadcasting:
In the best traditions of British constitutionalism, this body is unofficial
in status, unknown to the general public in the details of its member-
ship, applies uncertain and unpublished criteria of allocation, and is,
within its particular field of competence, all-powerful. 86
The concept of the CPPB may be a bit misleading. From the time
it last met in 1983 until it was formally disbanded in June 1997, the
broadcasters would present their proposal to the Secretary of the
Committee, who was also the Secretary to Leader of the House. The
government whip would then work the proposal through with the
leaders of the other parties and present an agreed upon proposal back
to the broadcasters. 87
The abolition of the CPPB perhaps reflects the shift away from
the old "traditions of British constitutionalism" and the entry into a
new era. It appears that the BBC began to question whether the proc-
ess for making allocation determinations was appropriate in 1996 and
based on legal advice, decided it should decide rather than propose
allocation arrangements. Then, the Referendum Party88 sued the BBC
85 See BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 236. Party election broadcasts on television
began in 1951, and were handled in the same manner as radio spots. See id. at 235-
36. In 1956, the practice was extended to commercial television companies who had
representatives join the CPPB. See id. at 236-37.
86 See RAWLINGS, supra note 52, at 153.
87 See BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 237.
88 The Referendum Party was established and largely funded by the late Sir James
Goldsmith. The objective of the Referendum Party, was to advocate the holding of a
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and the Independent Television Commission, challenging their alloca-
tion determinations on both procedural and substantive grounds. Al-
though the court rejected the Referendum Party's application on all
grounds, including unlawful delegation by the broadcasters to the
CPPB, it was clear the broadcasters would be on safer ground if they
were the decision-makers on allocation issues.8 9 In June, 1997, the
BBC and the Independent Television Association dismissed the Secre-
tary of the CPPB "thanking him for his services over the years and
explaining that on legal advice it would be more appropriate for the
BBC to receive representations directly from the various political par-
ties rather than through the Committee.
90
Although the methods and precise criteria used for determining
allocation of PEBs still are not publicly known, both the BBC's "Pro-
ducers Guidelines" in 1996 and the ITC's 1995 Programme Code
specify that parties fielding at least fifty candidates are entitled to at
least one five minute party election broadcast. 91 In the past, there have
been a maximum of five such broadcasts allocated for any one party
with an equal number given to the parties in government and in oppo-
sition.92 The allocation determinations carry significance beyond the
actual party election broadcasts. In order to meet the requirement of
political impartiality, broadcasters rely on the allocation formula for
determining how much time should be spent covering the various par-
ties during news programs.
This system, which is so foreign to the American observer, repre-
sents an effective means of controlling election costs. Many have sug-
gested applying the same methodology to the treatment of print and
poster advertisements, which currently account for a substantial per-
centage of all election expenditures. At the same time, however, there
is growing debate about the value of the party political broadcast and
the lack of interest in those that occur outside of election campaign
periods. Indeed, the BBC recently issued a consultation document
suggesting that the number of such broadcasts be reduced.93
referendum on whether Britain should adopt the European single currency. See BUT-
LER & KAVANAUGH, supra note 2, at 71-73.
89 See R. v. British Broadcasting Company [1997] EMLR 605.
90 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 84.
91 R. v. British Broadcasting Company [1997] EMLR 605.
92 See BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 238.
93 See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 84.
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iii. Company and Trade Union Regulation
Regulation of trade unions is a complex area worthy of its own
in-depth study. For purposes here, it is important to recall that trade
unions played an instrumental role in creating the Labour Party at the
beginning of this century. They have also been a key funding source
for the party throughout its existence, providing support through af-
filiation fees, grants, donations and contributions in-kind. Trade union
political support came under attack early on, and in 1910, the House
of Lords ruled in Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Os-
borne, that trade union parliamentary funds were invalid and enjoined
trade unions from engaging in political activities. 94 The effect of the
Osborne decision was short-lived as the Liberal government partially
reversed it when it passed the Trade Union Act 1913. Under this legis-
lation, trade unions could make political contributions provided that
certain conditions were met. The union had to ballot its members to
adopt political objects. Armed with this approval, it could then set up
a political fund from which political payments would be made. Any
member could ask to be exempt from paying the political fund levy by
"contracting out" without incurring any discriminatory repercus-
sions.95
Since 1913, the rules governing participation in trade union po-
litical funds have varied according to the party in government at the
time. The Trades Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927, enacted under
a Conservative government, required that union members affirma-
tively take steps to participate in the political levy, and hence "con-
tract-in." The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946, reversed
that requirement, as the Labour government preferred a system
whereby union members could elect not to participate by "contracting
out." Then, under the Thatcher government, a new requirement was
imposed in the Trade Union Act 1984. Trade unions were required to
ballot their members every ten years to see if they wanted to continue
to have a political fund. In addition, the Trade Union Act 1984 broad-
94 Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne [1910] AC 87, 97. See
EWING, FUNDING, supra note 24, at 47-52; see also KEITH EWING, TRADE UNIONS,
THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE LAW 97-121 (1982) [hereinafter EWING, TRADE UN-
IONS].
95 See EWING, TRADE UNIONS, supra note 94, at 97-121. See Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963) (citing the British Trade Union Act 1913
to suggest a means of accommodating union members who object to the political
activities funded by mandatory union assessments).
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ened the scope of activity that had to be financed through the unions'
political funds. 9
6
Trade unions file annual returns with the Certification Office for
Trade and Employers Associations. 97 These returns set forth basic
balance sheet information pertaining to the fund's financial activity
for the year, including cash in hand, income received, and expendi-
tures made. An examination of ten political funds over the span of
five years, however, revealed that the information provided widely
varies in specificity, and may or may not provide the reader with an
understanding of how the funds were spent. 98
In contrast to the regulation covering trade unions, corporate in-
volvement in party and election funding remains virtually unregu-
lated. Unlike trade unions, companies need not establish a separate
political fund from which to make political donations. Nor do compa-
nies need to seek shareholder approval before making such donations.
It was only with the passage of the Companies Act 1967, that compa-
nies were required to declare contributions made to political parties.
Currently, declarations for contributions of £200 or more must be
made in the company's annual report, a copy of which is filed with
the Companies Office. That Office does not maintain a separate listing
of company donations. Accordingly, the only way to determine which
companies are making political donations, the amount of such dona-
tions, or the identity of recipients is to examine the reports manually,
a laborious and expensive proposition. 99 Even if the annual reports for
96 See id.; see also FISHER, supra note 23, at 78 (describing the ways in which trade
unions fund the Labour Party). The initial balloting resulted in the retention of all
existing political funds and the creation of some new ones.
97 The Certification Officer approves the establishment and continuation of trade
union political funds. In addition, complaints concerning political funds are filed
with and investigated by the Certification Officer and it is the Certification Officer
who is authorized to issue an order remedying any violations of the rules. See Trade
Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act, §§ 32, 32A (1992).
98 As of the end of 1996, there were 39 political funds in operation by trade unions.
These political funds had total income of £15.7 million in 1995 (down from £18.1
million in 1994) and made some £16.2 million in expenditures (down from £18.4
million in 1994). CERTIFICATION OFFICE FOR TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' As-
SOCIATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CERTIFICATION OFFICER ch. 7 (1996).
99 Neil Moister, a researcher for the Labour Research Department, told the CSPL:
We try in our research to cover all the stock exchange companies which pro-
duce their glossy reports and make them freely available. The problem we find
is that there are over one million limited companies in the U.K., and the feasi-
bility of paying £3.50 a time to look at each company file at Companies
House is beyond our financial means.
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all publicly traded companies were regularly examined, there could
still be problems in ascertaining the level of company donations since
some companies channel their contributions through front organisa-
tions, such as the British United Industrialists, while others could be
giving through their executives. In neither instance would the contri-
butions necessarily be reported in the annual reports. As previously
noted, it appears that company donations to political parties are in de-
cline. Even with this declining participation and the limits on com-
pany donation research, the Labour Research Department nonetheless
traced 145 companies giving £2.7 million to the Conservative party in
1996, with smaller amounts to Labour and Liberal Democrats. M°
C. Election Petitions and Penalties
Although challenges relating to the funding of election cam-
paigns are relatively rare for the reasons discussed below, those that
are brought will generally be based on the returns filed by the election
agent. Election returns must be filed within thirty-five days of the
election, and any petition challenging the election is to be brought
within thirty-one days of the filing of the election return. 01 Petitions
are heard by two judges of the High Court, which sit as an election
court. If the court finds that the expenditure limits were exceeded, the
candidate and agent will be found guilty of an illegal practice and the
election result is void. 10 2 Moreover, if it is determined that the candi-
CSPL, supra note 7, 568 (transcripts of oral evidence on Apr. 16, 1998).
"O See id f[ 597.
'01 As previously noted, the election agent must file a return of election expenses at
the conclusion of the election campaign. To facilitate the expeditious filing of such
reports, the statute requires that: all election-related bills be submitted to the election
agent within twenty-one days after the results of the election are declared; all pay-
ments are to made by the agent within seven days thereafter; and election returns are
to filed within thirty-five days from the announcement of the election results. The
return, which must conform to a specific format, details inter alia all authorized
campaign expenditures, all funds received for the campaign from the candidate or
others, and all personal expenses incurred by the candidate. The completed form,
verified by the election agent and by the candidate before a Justice of the Peace,
together with all campaign bills and receipts, are delivered to the appropriate return-
ing officer. The returns are required to be available for inspection and copying upon
payment of a prescribed fee for a period of two years. See PARKER'S, supra note 61,
at 303-37.
'02 Failure to file the election return on time precludes the candidate from sitting or
voting in the House of Commons until the report actually is filed. See RPA § 85(1).
The statute also provides for the voiding of an election where a candidate knowingly
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date knew or consented to the illegal practice, the candidate is dis-
qualified for seven years. Corrupt practices, such as the filing a false
election return or bribery, are punishable by the criminal courts but
may serve as a basis, in civil proceedings, for disqualification. Crimi-
nal conviction for illegal practices may result in the imposition of a
fine while most corrupt practices carry a prison term of up to one year
and/or to a fine, 10 3 and disqualification from voting, being elected or
sitting in the House of Commons for a given amount of time or hold-
ing public or judicial office. 104
The statute contains "escape" clauses which enable, in certain
circumstances, those who have committed a violation of the election
law to be relieved of responsibility. For example, candidates or elec-
tion agents may on their own or in response to a petition acknowledge
having committed an illegal practice due to some inadvertent miscal-
culation or error.10 5 The application for relief must be made promptly
upon discovery of the error, with notice to the prosecutorial authority,
and must be substantiated by written or oral evidence that demon-
strates the illegal practice at issue, the inadvertent nature of the error,
the proper notice given ,and that it is just to excuse the applicant from
sanctions. 1
°6
D. Forms of State Aid
Unlike many of its European neighbors, there is no direct state
funding of political parties in Britain. Nonetheless, various forms of
state aid do exist. For the American observer, party political and elec-
tion broadcasts (PEBs) are perhaps the most notable form of assis-
tance, although they are not exactly state aid in as much as the broad-
casters and not the state provide the air-time. The major political par-
hires or consents to the hiring of an agent or canvasser if there were reasonable
grounds to know that the person had been convicted of a corrupt or illegal practice.
103 Conviction for some corrupt practices, such as personation, subjects the offender
to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine. It should be noted that all criminal
prosecutions must be brought within one year of the offence. See RPA § 176(1).
'4 See generally PARKER'S, supra note 61, at chs. 17 -20.
105 See id. at ch. 21 (discussing grounds and procedures governing applications for
relief). Author's discussions with a solicitor who handles election matters for candi-
dates of one of the main parties revealed that applications for relief are not particu-
larly common and rarely are filed for exceeding the expenditure limit. This solicitor
filed 9 or 10 such applications in connection with the 1997 general election, mostly
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ties all favour continuing at least the electoral portion of this program,
whereby the parties are allocated broadcast time on radio and televi-
sion during the electoral period to present their views and all paid po-
litical advertising is banned. As the Deputy General Secretary of the
Labour Party told the Neill Committee, the current system "allows
equality of opportunity," and changing it "would escalate the arms
race.'' °7 The monetary value of such broadcasts is not insubstantial.
In fact, the market value for televised party election broadcasts has
been estimated to be in the neighborhood of £56 million, without in-
cluding PEBs for local and European elections. 0 8
In addition to the political party broadcasts, political parties are
provided with free policing for their party conferences, at an esti-
mated value of £2,310,000 in 1992.109 Similarly, the State conducts
and pays for the annual registry of electors, so parties do not need to
devote their resources to getting potential voters registered to vote.
And, although not part of campaign costs, opposition parties receive
"Short money" to assist with carrying out parliamentary work in the
House of Commons and "Cranborne money" to assist them in the
House of Lords. The estimated amount of subsidy for parliamentary
work totals approximately £1,672,000 for 1998-99.'m Candidates
themselves are entitled to limited forms of state aid. For example,
they are entitled to mail one leaflet, free of charge, to each elector in
his or her constituency."' Candidates are also entitled to use public
buildings, without payment for rent, durinf the campaign period for
the purpose of holding public meetings,' although in practice this
has become irrelevant as such meetings are no longer commonly held.
'0' CSPL, supra note 7, 1001 (testimony of Margaret McDonagh on 21 Apr. 1998).
See also CSPL, supra note 7, 1186 (testimony of Lord Razzall on Apr. 22, 1998);
id. 1410 (testimony of Lord Parkinson on Apr. 22, 1998).
1o8 Party Election Broadcasts: Commercial Value, ITV (INDEP. TELEVISION ASSOC.,
London, England), Feb. 3, 1998, at 1.
109 See LINTON, supra note 6, at 101. As noted by Martin Linton, the local police
departments paid such costs until the passage of the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Bill 1993. Under this legislation, these costs will be paid by the Treasury for
parties with at least two elected MPs or who have obtained over a certain number of
votes. Id.
110 See CSPL, supra note 7, 2922 (recording testimony of Paul Tyler on May 7,
1998).
... See RPA § 91.
112 See RPA § 95.
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE BRITISH SYSTEM
The current U.K. party and election funding system, largely a
creature of the Victorian era, suffers from three major problems: se-
crecy, irrelevancy, and lack of accountability.
A. Secrecy
The secrecy surrounding party finances has been tightly main-
tained by the major parties in varying degrees. Although the Labour
Party has published accounts since 1906 and the Conservative Party
since the mid-1980s, the only mandatory disclosure currently in place
consists of expenditure returns filed by individual candidates at the
constituency level, and as previously discussed, even those mandatory
returns suffer from lack of comprehensive coverage and creative ac-
countancy.113 At the local constituency association and regional party
levels, there is simply no mandatory and virtually no voluntary disclo-
sure of financial information. In giving evidence to the Neill Commit-
tee, the Conservative Party Chairman noted that local conservative
party associations are "very independent and they view questions
about their finances from the centre with grave suspicion."' At the
national level, parties in recent years have embarked on some volun-
tary disclosure but the information produced lacks detail, a common
format, and remains unverifiable. Thus, at present, any analysis of
party funding must be based on "best estimates," and/or "insider" in-
formation gleaned from information released by the parties and sup-
plemented from other sources.115
The hesitancy to disclose donors may be difficult to understand
for those accustomed to the U.S. system of mandatory disclosure for
all contributors giving $200 or more per year. The argument against
such disclosure is framed in terms of right of privacy. As one witness
informed the Neill Committee:
I absolutely do not think that donations which are legitimate expendi-
tures paid out of taxed income should be declared. We ought to have
the privacy of a making a political contribution without being embar-
rassed. There can be many examples of where public declaration can be
embarrassing.116
113 See supra pp. 25-26.
114 See CSPL, supra note 7, 1358 (testimony of Lord Parkinson on Apr. 22, 1998).
115 See PINTo-DucHINsKY, supra note 34, at 320.
116 CSPL, supra note 7, 317 (recording testimony of Sir Stanley Kelms on Apr. 16,
1998). Lord Parkinson, Chairman of the Conservative Party, echoed this view, not-
ing that "many very honourable people like to spend their money in the way which
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There is grave concern that disclosing the names of donors will
diminish the flow of donations to the parties, although there is little
concrete evidence to support this fear.' 7 Another witness expressed
concern for possible retaliation and discrimination in the award of
bids by Labour controlled local government councils if it were known
that certain companies were financial donors to the Conservative
party. 1 8 The Conservative party has tentatively proposed the estab-
lishment of an independently administered Political Donations Insti-
tute (PDI), which would serve as a blind trust for large and/or anony-
mous donations. According to the party, this would preclude parties
from knowing who funded them and hence avoid the allegation of in-
fluence buying." 9 The proposal suffers from two major problems. It
runs counter to the very concept of openness and it could easily be
circumvented by donors who choose to tell the party about their dona-
tions through the PDI mechanism.
Another concern commonly voiced about mandatory disclosure
focuses on the administrative and regulatory nightmare that such dis-
closure could engender. The treasurer of the Liberal Democrat Party
noted that a major concern "is the enormous bureaucracy that would
be required . . . to make a declaration of everybody who had given
they think fit, and they do not want to sacrifice their privacy as a result." CSPL,
supra note 7, 1375 (recording testimony of Lord Parkinson on Apr. 16, 1998).
117 Peter Riddell, Political Columnist for The Times, thinks it depends on "whether
you have a culture of privacy" and notes that Americans are not troubled by disclo-
sure.
It is almost a badge of pride . . . giving and wanting it to be
known you have given.., because you want to be in with the
people who are elected. In other countries, like Canada and else-
where, there has been a fall-off in donations. It is very difficult to
know which way Britain will go in that."
CSPL, supra note 7, 12 (testimony of Peter Riddell on Apr. 15, 1998). Professor
Pulzer concludes that it is impossible "to prove what effect disclosure has," but
notes that in Germany, "since the disclosure rules have become more rigorous, the
number of very high donations has declined." Id. 624 (oral evidence of Professor
Pulzer on Apr. 16, 1998). Two fund-raisers offered the view that disclosure could
generate larger contributions from some donors who do not want to be seen as giv-
ing less than others. See id. 1594-95 (recording testimony of Henry Drucker on
Apr. 29, 1998); CSPL, supra note 7, 1397 (recording testimony of Lord Levy on
May 13, 1998).
118 See CSPL, supra note 7, 1378 (recording testimony of Michael Trend on Apr.
22 1998). See also id. 5024 (recording testimony of Mike Russell and George Reid
on Jun. 3, 1998).
19 See id. 1398, 1433 (testimony of Lord Parkinson on Apr. 22, 1998).
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£50 at the constituency level. We would have to employ more people
to do that than to fight elections.' 120 One leading British expert re-
counted his dismay at the American system that generates reams of
computerized data. Another confessed disquiet that in the United
States, so much information could be obtained at the click of a com-
puter, while others view the system as generating an "over-supply of
information of which very little satisfi[es] any legitimate interest. 121
And yet, secrecy surrounding party funding fosters a climate of in-
trigue and cloaks donations with at least a suspicion of impropriety, if
not sleaze. Comprehensive disclosure will not eliminate such news
stories; it will, however, enable them to be based on fact and not just
innuendo.
Reliable financial information serves another important purpose.
Funding trends and practices shift over time. Without data, which dis-
closure would provide, these trends are more difficult to ascertain and
interpret. It has been alleged, for example, that parties are having to
rely on larger donations from a smaller number of donors and that
greater political participation should be encouraged. Indeed, for many,
the health of democracy depends on broad public participation and
hence, political parties should be raising money from a large number
of contributors rather than large sums of money from a limited num-
ber of donors. Steps may be taken to expand a party's donor base, but
absent publicly available information on donors and donations, no ac-
curate assessment will be possible as to the success of the measures
implemented. Regularized disclosure, moreover, may reveal problems
in certain areas of party funding that would not otherwise be visible
and that warrant corrective measures. Finally, appropriately detailed
disclosure would serve an important role in enforcing any limitations
on the source of donations or the amount of permissible expenditures.
B. Irrelevancy
A second problem area with the current regulatory system relates
to the question of its continued relevancy. It is well accepted that the
current rules were implemented in an era when "elections were genu-
inely local affairs" and that now "campaigns are fought at a national
scale."122 New campaign methodologies have evolved as a result of
120 Id. 1085 (testimony of Lord Razzall on Apr. 22, 1998).
121 Comment of Dr. David Butler at Charter 88 Conference, Jan. 28,1998; see also
CSPL, supra note 7, 913 (recording testimony of Ewing on Apr. 21, 1998).
122 See generally Johnston & Pattie, supra note 34, at 123-33 (discussing the history
of British campaign finance); THE HANSARD SOCIETY FOR PARLIAMENTARY Gov-
ERNMENT, AGENDA FOR CHANGE: THE REPORT OF THE HANSARD COMMISSION ON
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innovations in polling, message development, direct mail, and media
manipulation. Using the new campaign technologies, the parties have
capitalized on the gap provided by the court's ruling in the Tronoh
Mines case which exempted "generic" advertising from counting
against local expenditure limits. As a result, the national campaign
blossomed and by 1983, national party spending reportedly exceeded
total local candidate spending for the first time. 123 The information
available for subsequent elections shows the ever-increasing impor-
tance of the national campaign, at least monetarily. In short, the only
area regulated under current law is the area of least financial impor-
tance in today's elections; the key area simply remains undisclosed
and unregulated.
If the current situation were just an interesting theoretical anom-
aly, the matter would not necessarily warrant much attention. How-
ever, this regulatory conundrum is a pressing concern given other on-
going changes in the British electoral process. In particular, there will
soon be four different voting systems in operation in the United King-
dom. Parliamentary elections in Britain are conducted on a "first past
the post basis" (FPTP) in single member constituencies, similar to
most federal congressional contests in the United States. Under this
system, the candidate obtaining the largest number of votes in a par-
ticular constituency is declared the winner.
The 1999 British elections for Members of the European Parlia-
ment will be conducted on a proportional representational basis using
regional lists, and the Scottish Parliamentary and Welsh Assembly
elections will be conducted on the additional member system, a mix-
ture of party lists and FPTP models. To confound matters further, in
Northern Ireland, the parliamentary elections to Westminster are
FPTP but a single transferable vote system is used in local elections,
European Parliamentary elections, and elections to the Northern Ire-
land Assembly. The current regulations, however, are based upon the
traditional single member constituency model with expenditure limits
imposed on individual candidates. This model does not readily fit the
new electoral systems soon to be a part of the British electoral
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 35-37 (1991) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR CHANGE];
RAWLINGS, supra note 52, at 133-53 (discussing the history behind the legal frame-
work for election campaigns).
'2 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Trends in British Party Funding 1983-1987, 42 PAR-
LIAMENTARY AFFAIS (1989).
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scene. 124 Accordingly, new regulatory regimes must be developed and
implemented without delay.
Finally, as demonstrated earlier, the current regulatory scheme is
confined by practice, if not by law, to short periods of time close to
elections. This may have been appropriate in the past, but fails to re-
flect that campaigns are increasingly an ongoing process. As several
witnesses acknowledge in their evidence to the Neill committee, the
distinction between election spending and non-election spending is
more and more an artifice. The Chairman of the Association of Elec-
toral Administrators stated:
The last general election started many months, if not years, before the
election was actually called. Expenditure was undoubtedly being in-
curred on a national basis and within constituencies, where candidates
had already been selected or were likely to be selected and who were
clearly letting themselves be known to the public by doing a variety of
things. Whether or not the expenditure that they incurred so doing ever
ended up in an election return is somewhat questionable.125
In short, under current law, expenditures associated with the early
part of election campaigning are rarely disclosed or otherwise regu-
lated, and therefore the true cost of campaigns remains undiscover-
able.
C. Lack of Accountability
The third area warranting our attention concerns enforcement of
the existing laws. Even accepting that early campaign spending might
be excluded under a narrow interpretation of the term "expenditure,"
there is credible evidence that not all expenditure incurred in the heat
of election campaigns is included in election returns. However, the
law, as written, provides for judicial scrutiny of petitions (or com-
plaints in U.S. terms) alleging non-compliance with the expenditure
limits and for criminal prosecutions for such violations. Indeed, the
remedies prescribed are severe, including voiding of the election, fu-
124 See CSPL, supra note 7, 2835-36 (recording testimony of Ron Johnston on
May 7, 1998). See The Rt. Hon. Lord Jenkins of Hillmead, The Independent Com-
mission on the Voting System (visited Aug. 21, 1998) <http://www.
votingcom.gov.uk>.
'2 See CSPL, supra note 7, 2085 (testimony of John Turner on Apr. 30, 1998).
See also id. 1941 (testimony of Michael Crick on Apr. 30, 1998) ("The trouble is
that in all of these cases enormous amounts of spending went on before the by-
election was officially called .... "). In key marginal seats, campaigning actually
may begin two or three years before the election. See id. 2802 (recording testi-
mony of Ron Johnston on May 7, 1998).
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ture disqualification of the candidate, imposition of a penalty and
even criminal liability. The question this raises is whether the system
actually works in practice. The fact that the last conviction for submit-
ting a false expenditure return occurred in 1923, despite wide ac-
knowledgment that expenditure limits are not observed, at least not in
by-elections, suggests that the system is not as effective as it could
be.126
Several factors join together to deter the filing of election peti-
tions. First, there are generally fees imposed for inspecting candi-
dates' expense returns filed with returning officers. Second, the in-
formation that must be disclosed on those returns is limited and of du-
bious accuracy. Third, it takes time to investigate, assemble and ana-
lyze information evidencing falsified returns, yet the time for filing
such petitions is strictly limited. Fourth, challenges must be brought in
court as there is no administrative or regulatory body in existence
with an investigative or enforcement role. Judicial petitions are likely
to implicate at least three parties (the petitioner, the prevailing candi-
date, and the returning officer) and the costs might run as high as
£50,000. As a practical matter, few electors will be able or willing to
put up adequate security for such a petition, which leaves the matter
to the parties themselves. The political parties have little impetus to
pursue such matters as it would most likely lead to similar complaints
being filed against them in return.
No party dares to challenge their opponents, since they all know that, if
not in this by-election then in many others, they have all been guilty at
some time. There is considerable evidence that top party officials have
even discussed the problem amongst themselves and reached a kind of
understanding not to shop each other. One former national party offi-
cial goes so far as to describe it as a "conspiracy."' 127
126 Member of Parliament elected in May, 1997 was recently charged with submit-
ting a false election report. See Fran Abrades, MP Charge Over Election Expenses,
INDEP., Apr. 24, 1998. Even the news coverage of the event noted that it was "highly
unusual for such charges to be brought, even though allegations of election expenses
irregularities are common." Id. Another MP, Mohammed Sarwar, faces criminal
charges including electoral fraud and expense irregularities in connection with the
1997 election. See Lawrence Donegan, Labour Agents Charged, GUARDIAN, Jan. 16,
1998, at 5.
127 See CSPL, supra note 7, at 184 (opening statement by Michael Crick on Apr. 30,
1998).
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The criminal prosecution route remains an alternative, but com-
peting demands on police resources, coupled with legal ambiguities
make this route less viable than it could be. 128
V. PROCESS FOR REFORM
A. Committee on Standards In Public Life: A Peculiarly British
Model
There is a phrase prevalent among British civil servants - when
faced with dealing with a particularly thorny problem they talk about
"hitting the ball into the long grass." The idea is that with the ball
having landed in the long grass, everyone will get bored looking for it
and go away and get a new one. In the same way, if a problem can be
sidelined for long enough it may disappear (or at least be overtaken by
new problems).
This was certainly the view of many commentators on the deci-
sion by then Prime Minister John Major to set up the Committee on
Standards in Public Life to deal with a range of scandals involving
Members of Parliament and Ministers who had rocked his government
during the summer of 1994.129 The prescribed mission of the Commit-
tee on Standards in Public Life was:
To examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all holders
of public office, including arrangements relating to financial and com-
mercial activities, and make recommendations as to any changes in
present arrangements which might be required to ensure the highest
standards of propriety in public life.'30
There was one key element to the new Committee, however, that
made it very different from any previous attempt at tackling ethical
issues in British public life. A true "long grass" solution would have
been to set up a Royal Commission or Committee of Inquiry to exam-
'28 See id. 1996 (testimony of Rory Mates, co-editor of Scholfield's Election Law,
on Apr. 30, 1998); see also id. 1924 (testimony of Michael Crick on Apr. 30,
1998).
129 There had been accusations that Members of Parliament were accepting money
for tabling questions in the House of Commons. Ministers who had left their jobs
following sex scandals were supposed to be taking lucrative jobs with companies
with whom they had previously had a relationship while in Office; and it was being
suggested that appointments to quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations
("Quangos"), many of which spent millions of pounds a year, were being condi-
tioned by "cronyism" rather than by appointment on merit. See CHALLEN, supra note
4, at ch. 7.
13 HANSARD Col. 758 (Oct. 25, 1994)
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ine the issues and report maybe two or three years later when most
people would have forgotten the issues. This Committee had a con-
tinuing existence and was asked by John Major to make its first report
within six months. 3
The former Prime Minister made it clear that the remit of the
Committee did not extend to investigating individual allegations of
misconduct. Although at first some considered this to be a disadvan-
tage, it has meant that the Committee has been able to focus on the
future rather than the past with an eye towards establishing ethical
frameworks for future conduct.
132
B. Study on Political Party Funding
The manifesto on which the Labour Party fought the 1997 General
Election contained three significant pledges relating to the funding of po-
litical parties. First, the Government said it would outlaw foreign dona-
tions; second, donations above £5,000 would be declared; and third, the
issue of party funding would be referred, more generally, to the Committee
on Standards in Public Life.
Following the election of the new Labour Government in May
1997, Ministers discussed with the then Chairman of the Committee,
Lord Nolan, how a study on party funding could be undertaken. Lord
Nolan made it clear that, although in principle he was happy to under-
take such a study, it would not be practicable for him to do so before
his three-year term of office ended in October 1997. The Government
131 The Author notes that the Committee has ten members, appointed for three-year
terms, who come from various professions. Each of the major political parties nomi-
nates a member of that party to serve on the Committee, but they serve in their indi-
vidual capacity, not as a representative of the party. The Committee is served by a
small secretariat.
132 The Committee's first report, published in May 1995, made significant recom-
mendations on the reform of the ethical procedures in the House of Commons, in-
cluding the introduction of an independent Parliamentary Commissioner for Stan-
dards; new arrangements for vetting ministerial jobs when they left office; and a
new Public Appointments Commissioner to audit and oversee appointments to
Quangos. See COMMrrrEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FiRST REPORT, Vol. 1
(1995), Cmd. 2850-1, at 7-13 [hereinafter CSPL vol. 1]. The Committee then turned
its attention to local Quangos and later to the ethical framework for local govern-
ment. See id. at 11-13, ch. 4. In each instance, virtually all of the Committee's rec-
ommendations have been adopted. The Committee has also developed a number of
ethical standards, including the "seven principles of public life" which are intended
to serve as an overarching framework for the actions of those in public service. See
id. at 14. These principles are: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability,
openness, honesty, and leadership. See id.
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therefore waited on the appointment of the new Chairman of the
Committee, Lord Neill of Bladen, QC, before formally referring the
issue of party funding to the Committee.1 33 On November 12, 1997
the terms of reference for the present study on the funding of political
parties, as announced by the Prime Minister, were "to review issues in
relation to the funding of political parties, and to make recommenda-
tions as to any changes in present arrangements.' 34
The referral coincided with the blossoming controversy surround-
ing the Bernie Eccelstone donation. As noted earlier, the Chief Execu-
tive and effective owner of the Formula One racing circuit had con-
tributed to the Labour Party before the election and had met with
Tony Blair in mid-October, at a time when the Government was con-
sidering whether to support a ban on tobacco advertising for sporting
events. The Labour Party sought the advice of the incoming Chairman
of the Committee on the advisability of accepting any further dona-
tions from that source.135 Lord Neill noted that although it was not the
Committee's normal procedure to advise in individual circumstances,
as incoming Chairman, he felt obliged to offer his views, especially as
the advice had been sought by the Labour Party, and consequently the
Government, in exceptional circumstances. He made it clear that
while he did not see any impropriety either in the giving or in the re-
ceipt of the donation, given the circumstances surrounding the excep-
tion of Formula One from the ban on tobacco sponsorship, the Party
(and the Government) had a significant problem of perception which
could only be dealt with by returning the donation.
With this high-profile beginning, the Committee set about the in-
vestigation of party funding.' 6 The Committee decided that the proc-
ess that had served it well in its previous investigations should be
broadly followed in its investigation into the funding of political par-
133 The author notes that the Prime Minister announced Lord Neill's appointment in
mid-October and it became effective in early November 1997.
134 CSPL vol. 1, supra note 132 at 15.
135 The author notes that the Labour Party's request for guidance did not disclose the
amount of the initial donations (E1 million), nor any information about the circum-
stances surrounding the solicitation or making of the contribution.
136 The issue of political party funding and election financing has been subject of
several studies. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AID TO POLrrI-
CAL PARTIES, 1976, Cmnd. 6601 (Houghton Committee Report); THE HANSARD So-
CIETY FOR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, PAYING FOR POLrICs: THE REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES (1981); AGENDA FOR
CHANGE, supra note 122; see also HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FUNDING OF POLrrI-
CAL PARTIES, SECOND REPORT (1994).
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ties. In December 1997, the Committee published a consultation paper
which set out the issues and questions that it considered relevant to its
study. 137 Some 30,000 copies of the paper were distributed to the po-
litical parties, to academics, to commentators, and to others who re-
quested the paper following widespread newspaper advertising. The
text of the document was also published on the Internet. Overall, some
350 submissions were received in response to the consultation docu-
ment.
The Committee concluded that it would be helpful to have a de-
gree of factual information about party finances in recent years and
thus asked the political parties to provide information about the
source, origin, and amount of income, and the type of expenditures
incurred at the national and local levels for the previous five years.
The parties cooperated with the Committee's request, for, as noted
below, the Committee has no power to compel production of docu-
ments or answers to written questions.
The Committee also believed it should take account of overseas
experience. Members visited Sweden, Germany, Canada, and the
United States to look at the political party and election financing sys-
tems in force in those countries. In common with previous studies, the
Committee decided to hold open public hearings to which commenta-
tors, academics, players in the process (e.g., current and past party
chairs, fund-raisers, donors, etc.) and others who had provided inter-
esting submissions would be invited to provide testimony in public.
Hearings were scheduled over a ten-week period, April through June
1998, in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
C. Prospects for Reform
With the completion of the public hearings, the Committee pre-
pared its report and recommendations, which it published in late 1998.
The Committee's report was submitted to the Prime Minister, who
will decide how its recommendations will be implemented.
The Government, as noted, is committed to legislating on the two
areas of party funding set out in its Manifesto. It is clear that, when it
receives the Committee's report, the Government will introduce legis-
lation on those areas, but it will also be expected to deal with the other
aspects of party funding covered in the Committee's report and to
produce draft legislation during the 1998-99 session of Parliament.
137 The consultation document, THE NEILL COMMITTEE, ISSUES AND QUESTIONS: THE
FUNDING OF POLrIcAL PaTIES (1998), covered topics such as spending limits, pro-
hibitions and limitations on contributions, disclosure, state funding, honours, and
accountability.
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As an advisory Committee to the Prime Minister, the Committee
on Standards in Public Life has no powers to summon witnesses. It
has no powers to call for papers or for the production of documents.
As mentioned earlier, it cannot investigate individual allegations of
improper behaviour. It appears, however, to be extremely influential.
That influence arises from a number of sources. First, although a crea-
tion of the Conservative power when in government, the Committee
continues to be supported by Prime Minister Tony Blair and by the
political parties. Second, its members have considerable experience in
a variety of public and private sectors. Third, as mentioned previ-
ously, the Committee, as a standing body, has a continuing existence;
in practice that means it is able to return to issues it has previously
examined and comment on the success or failure of those to whom the
recommendations are addressed in implementing them.
In short, the structure produced in Great Britain to deal with is-
sues of ethics and, by extension, questions of party funding - the
creation of a body with no power, but with tremendous influence -
can be seen as a typically British approach.
VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Given the structural differences between the U.S. and U.K. gov-
ernmental systems, few, if any, components of the British party and
election funding system would appear to have direct applicability to
the U.S. model. Nonetheless, consideration of the British approach
helps highlight some of the basic assumptions that underlie the U.S.
system, and that implicitly frame the debate on campaign finance re-
form. In this sense, the British example can serve as a catalyst for re-
assessing those assumptions to see if they warrant reaffirmance or
disavowal. The process ideally could clarify the values we seek to fos-
ter and facilitate the development of a regulatory framework tailored
to fit the current needs of our own system.
A. Party Versus Campaign Funding
The British refer to this subject area as "party funding" as op-
posed to the U.S. phrase of "campaign finance." The different termi-
nology is not merely a question of semantics for it reflects a signifi-
cant conceptual divergence between the two countries. The British
phraseology places the emphasis on the general funding of political
parties, which are viewed as having a role to play in democracy be-
yond the fielding and funding of candidates for election. It also re-
flects the greater importance of the political parties in the parliamen-
tary system. By contrast, the American expression gives prominence
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to the electoral campaign, and to all the players in the process. Indeed,
the focus of U.S. legislation in this area speaks in terms of "political
committees" which includes, but is not limited to, political parties. It
may well be beneficial to step back from the minutiae of campaign
finance reform proposals to reassess what role political parties play
and what role they should play in the American system. If a broader
role than the current one is envisioned, then consideration must be
given to how legislation could be drafted to most effectively advance
those aspirations.
B. Freedom of Expression
A second revelation for the American observer, especially one
versed in constitutional jurisprudence, is the discovery that democracy
need not collapse simply because the right of free speech is given less
deference than it is in the United States. The British regulatory
scheme with its spending limits on parliamentary candidates and third
parties, its ban on paid broadcast advertising, and the requirement that
all candidates participating in a program consent to its broadcast'38
would simply never survive judicial scrutiny in the United States.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly found similar provi-
sions unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the constitu-
tional right of free speech in Buckley v. Valeo, 13 and has continued to
rule in favor of an expansive reading of the First Amendment ever
since. And yet, as the European Court in the recent Bowman decision
and the Canadian court in the Libman case demonstrated, 140 there are
other means to balance the right of free speech and the desire to pre-
serve the integrity of the electoral process. Both the European and
Canadian courts recognized the crucial importance of freedom of ex-
pression in a democratic society and the need to scrutinize carefully
any infringement of that right, especially when political speech is at
issue. In so doing, both of these courts found it entirely legitimate for
legislation to strive for "equality of participation" or " a level playing
field" and acknowledged that some restriction on freedom of expres-
sion would be tolerated to achieve that goal. In Buckley, the U.S. Su-
preme Court found that restricting "the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
138 During a pending election, the statute prohibits broadcasts about a constituency
election unless those candidates who take part in the program consent to have it
broadcast. See RPA § 93.
139 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
'40 Libman v. Attorney Gen. of Que. [1997] 151 D.L.R. 385 (Can.).
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foreign to the First Amendment."'141 Since that decision, the principle
of euality has virtually disappeared from the framework of the de-
bate.N4
The United States holds itself out to be a leader of the democratic
tradition, yet its system for financing elections, the keystone of the
democratic process, is subject to national and international derision.
British experts in the field have uniformly criticized the vast sums of
money involved in American elections and have variously described
the system as an "administrative nightmare,"' 143 "almost openly cor-
rupt,"' 44 and "immensely cumbersome, bureaucratic and unsatisfac-
tory." 45 It may be time to shift the focus of the debate in the United
States from what reform proposals will pass constitutional scrutiny to
reconsidering the constitutional construct itself. In so doing, the
United States would be well served to examine the regulatory prac-
tices and jurisprudence of other countries where greater restriction on
freedom of expression has been accepted in an effort to provide fair
and equitable elections.
C. Process of Reform
It has been nearly twenty years since Congress enacted the last
significant campaign finance bill. Yet cries for reform have been
nearly continuous and from many different sources - from successful
and unsuccessful candidates, from the regulators, from public interest
groups, and from disenchanted, individual citizens. Why then, has vir-
tually every attempt at reform failed? The answer to this question is
certainly multi-dimensional. One facet of the problem relates to the
141 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
142 The author of the Court of Appeals decision in Buckley, Judge Skelly Wright,
wrote a critical essay on the Supreme Court's rejection of political equality. See J.
Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Ob-
stacle to Political Equality, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982). The goal of equality has
reemerged in recent years and has been a motivating factor in some of the legislative
reform measures considered and enacted in various states. See generally ANTHONY
CORRADO ET AL., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCE BOOK, 337-43 (1997)
(discussing attempts by states and the courts to clarify the boundary lines of cam-
paign finance reform); see generally Thomas E. Mann, Deregulating Campaign Fi-
nance: Solution or Chimera?, BROOKINGS REv., Winter 1998, at 20-21.
143 CSPL, supra note 7, 6168 (comment of Lord Parkinson on Jun. 11, 1998).
144 David Butler, Comments at Charter 88 Seminar, Jan. 28, 1998; CSPL, supra note
7, 2198 (testimony of Martin Bell on Apr. 30, 1998)
145 CSPL, supra note 7, 6025 (comment of Anthony King on Jun. 11, 1998).
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process for reform itself. The congressional track record suggests that
it is not the right forum for the development of reform proposals.
It is time to explore other approaches, including the idea of an in-
dependent committee, comprised of academics, practitioners and pos-
sibly jurists. The all-party Committee on Standards in Public Life in
Britain or the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Fi-
nancing in Canada are two models that may offer valuable insight into
such an undertaking. An ongoing and committed group with an ex-
plicit mandate and a fixed time-frame in which to issue its initial re-
port could generate proposals that could be presented to Congress in
the same manner the committee that examined and made recommen-
dations regarding the closing of military bases operated.146
In developing a solution to the campaign funding problem, such a
committee would be wise to consider not only reform attempts at the
state level in the United States, but can also the experience of other
countries. Exposure to other governmental systems will enable the
committee members to view our own system with a fresh perspective.
In addition, despite the differences, there a number of common issues.
Great Britain, for example, like the United States, is encountering
definitional issues, such as what constitutes an "election expenditure."
Similarly, both countries are grappling with the issue of third party or
pressure group involvement in the electoral process. And, of course,
the issue of circumvention and effective enforcement remains a com-
mon concern.
146 See generally Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by
Commission, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 331 (1991) (offering "government by commis-
sion" as an alternative to congressional political stalemate).
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